Engagement for Governments, Inadmissibility for Victims? Canada’s Double Standard on Iran
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent remarks that Canada should consider restoring a diplomatic presence in Iran have reignited an important debate. Defending the proposal, he stated that “engagement is not endorsement,” arguing that maintaining an embassy or diplomatic relations does not imply approval of the Islamic Republic or its policies.
That principle deserves careful consideration. But if engagement does not equal endorsement for governments, why does it appear to mean something entirely different for the victims of that very regime?
Before Canada listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity, a decision overwhelmingly welcomed by Iranians, including countless former conscripts who themselves suffered under the organization, the government repeatedly assured Canadians that individuals subjected to mandatory service in the IRGC would not be unfairly affected. Those assurances reflected an obvious truth: compulsory conscription under an authoritarian regime is not a matter of free choice. Yet today, despite those commitments, many former conscripts continue to receive Procedural Fairness Letters (PFLs) alleging inadmissibility based solely on the conscription they were legally compelled to perform.
In numerous cases, immigration officers explicitly acknowledge that the applicant performed only routine or menial duties during compulsory service. Nevertheless, the conclusion often remains unchanged: because there is no exemption for former conscripts under the current legal framework, and because the applicant’s self-declared duties “…were performed within the structure and under the authority of the IRGC” (IRCC Procedural Fairness Letter, 2026), they are considered to have been members of a listed terrorist organization. The practical consequence is extraordinary: an individual who had no choice, no control over their assignment, and no intention of supporting the IRGC may still be found inadmissible to Canada. Yet the Canadian government now argues that re-establishing an embassy and engaging diplomatically with the very regime that commands, directs, and relies upon the IRGC should not be regarded as endorsement.
This is more than a legal inconsistency; it is a profound moral contradiction.
A young Iranian who reports for compulsory conscription because refusing would result in imprisonment or other severe consequences is considered sufficiently connected to the IRGC to face permanent immigration consequences. Meanwhile, the Canadian government argues that opening an embassy, engaging directly with the Islamic Republic, and conducting official state-to-state relations with the regime itself should not be interpreted as endorsement.
If government-to-government engagement is not endorsement, how can compulsory, involuntary service under coercion be treated as evidence of meaningful affiliation?
The contradiction becomes even more striking when viewed alongside Canada’s own policies. Canada has listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity because of its role in repression, regional destabilization, and terrorism. Former conscripts substantially supported that decision because they, too, regard themselves as victims of the organization. Yet many of those same victims now find themselves labelled as members of the very organization they never voluntarily joined.
Former conscripts did not choose where they served. They did not choose the organization to which they were assigned. They did not choose the political system that forced them into conscription. Many fled Iran precisely because they rejected the regime and everything it represents. Today, they seek only safety, family reunification, and the opportunity to build productive lives in Canada.
Justice requires consistency. If Canada recognizes that diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic does not constitute endorsement, it should also recognize that compulsory conscription performed under coercion does not constitute voluntary support or meaningful membership in a terrorist organization.
The same principle cannot reasonably produce two entirely different standards: one for governments that voluntarily choose to engage with the Islamic Republic regime, and another for innocent individuals who never had a choice in the first place.